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Abstract 
This paper seeks to problematise and complexify scholarly accounts of contemporary 
emotional repression in Western contexts by presenting counter evidence in the form of 
two examples of post-secular collective affectivity and their ritual expressions. It 
argues that both narratives of emotional repression and expression fail to capture the 
non-linear complexity of processes of cultural transformation, which have resulted in 
the simultaneous expression and repression of ritualistic affects that are products of our 
evolutionary embodied history. Drawing on insights from affect theory, this paper 
seeks to illustrate how contingent yet nonetheless residual ritualistic affects have 
become repressed in the nominally secular public sphere in modernity. This has 
presented certain obstacles to the open communal display of religious ritual, and, as a 
corollary, the expression of certain religious affects, which have subsequently re-
emerged in post-secular ritual spaces that are both publically private and privately 
public, carved by contemporary renewal movements. Two of these ‘formations of the 
post-secular’ are explored here: the Sunday Assembly, a secular church, and Mountain 
of Fire and Miracles Ministries, an international Pentecostal Deliverance church. 
Keywords: secularism, post-secularism, ritual, emotion, affect theory, modernity, 
Pentecostalism, postmodernism 
Introduction 
In an otherwise comprehensive account of religious emotion published in 2010, Ole Riis and 
Linda Woodhead put forward the claim that in the contemporary Western context, ‘“hot” 
expressions of strong emotion are frowned upon…in most public places’.1 Riis and 
Woodhead suggest it has become ‘embarrassing and low status to be hot’, concluding that 
there has been a gradual ‘blunting’ of emotional expression, resulting in the ‘very 
limited…emotional repertoire of late modernity’.2 Embedded implicitly in their position is a 
certain schema of modernity which understands the gradual divorcing of the public from the 
private to be successful, complete, and universal. As a corollary, ‘hot’ emotion - which we 
might assume means enthusiastic and expressive emotion - is presumed to have become 
privatised, having bowed to the modern regime and suffered the same fate as its counterpart, 
religion. And yet scholars have for a long time known that the secularising forces of 
modernity have largely failed in this project, that ‘private interests are always leaking into 
public space’ and that religion has gleaned a new visibility in our post-secular age.3 This 
observation is not purely sociological; academics operating across the humanities and in 
critical theory have recently extended invitations to theologians to engage in central 
conversations reconsidering notions such as gender and representation.4 Theologians are 
responding with openness and reciprocity, eager to incorporate social scientific methods into 
their research.5 This paper therefore seeks to interrogate and problematise Riis and 
Woodhead’s claim by virtue of its reliance on a particular conception of modernity and its 
bounded spaces that has become obsolete. This becomes particularly apparent when 
accounting for recent ritual performances of collective religious enthusiasm that serve to 
upset the tidy seclusion of the private from the public, or at least the illusion of it. This paper 
will explore two examples of these post-secular movements: the Sunday Assembly, a self-
professed ‘secular church’ first established in London, and Mountain of Fire and Miracles 
church, a Pentecostal Deliverance church founded in Nigeria with branches throughout the 
West. These far-reaching devotional bodies are hardly fringe subcultures; the popularity of 
the Sunday Assembly has propelled it to launch over seventy chapters in eight different 
countries, and the Mountain of Fire and Miracles church claims to have re-birthed over half a 
billion souls that dip in and out of spiritual ecstasy.6 The large-scale ‘worship’ sessions 
hosted by these movements in metropolitan civic centres straddle the fence between public 
and private, as they operate as important loci of ‘diversity’ within the liberal and 
multicultural habitus of secular modernity.7 Their proficiency in appropriating the latest 
communication technologies for evangelistic purposes has allowed them to gain large 
followings on social media and hence participate in what those working in technology studies 
call the ‘recalibration’ of the public/private divide, and its ‘complex interpenetration’, 
privatising the ‘public’ and publicising the ‘private’.8  
In offering a critique of Riis and Woodhead’s narrative of emotional repression, I will 
apply insights emerging from affect theory to these examples in order to argue that collective 
religious ritual is a medium through which certain religious affects have historically, even 
evolutionarily, been experienced and expressed. In becoming formally (or, at least, 
nominally) secular according to the modern rubric, the ‘neutrality’ of the public sphere has 
presented certain obstacles to the open communal display of religious ritual, and, as a 
corollary, the expression of certain religious affects. Contingent yet nonetheless 
evolutionarily ‘intransigent’ ritualistic affects have become repressed and subsequently rear 
their heads in what I am calling ‘formations of the post-secular’, taking my cue from Talal 
Asad’s ‘formations of the secular’.9 In so doing, I hope to show that late modernity’s 
emotional repertoire is not ‘limited’, ‘blunted’ and ‘cool’, but diverse, sharp and at times hot 
in character.10 This, I hope, will further encourage theologians to draw on the valuable tools 
offered by affect theorists and anthropologists of post-secularity for theorising the 
interdependency of ritual, emotion and the body in their current writings on sacrament, 
pathos and the incarnation. If the contemporary post-secular context operates to blur the 
oppositional divisions between belief and unbelief, public and private, reason and emotion, 
then those interested in analysing it – whether from a theological or cultural perspective - are 
not exempt from the challenge to conceive of ways in which these longstanding analytical 
dualisms might be overcome, should they no longer serve their purpose. 
 
Inverted Genealogies of Emotion 
Let me begin by examining Riis and Woodhead’s claim. Whilst the two are eager to assure 
readers that Western society has not become ‘“post-emotional” in the sense that emotions are 
absent or superficial or universally degraded’, they are nonetheless confident that late 
modernity brings ‘certainly both a subduing and blunting of emotion’ overall.11 This implies 
a change is afoot, which begs two key questions: Were human beings more emotional in the 
past? And if so, what is behind this process of emotional diminution or repression? In support 
of their argument, Riis and Woodhead appear to be drawing on a Weberian narrative of 
‘purposive rationalisation’, a Freudian account of the repressive effects of civilisation on the 
motives of the Id, together with a Foucauldian notion of ‘discipline’.12 They are influenced by 
Norbert Elias’ classic text, The Civilising Process, which puts forward the argument that the 
modern European individual, the Enlightenment man, is more emotionally (and physically) 
restrained than his medieval counterparts, who were ‘wild, cruel, prone to violent outbreaks 
and abandoned to the joy of the moment’.13 According to this kind of narrative, Reformation 
theology served to internalise behavioural sanctions and communal ritualistic expressions 
which were previously administered by the church. Whilst discourse about controlling the 
(fallen) passions goes back to Augustine (and, further, to the Stoics), anxiety about inflamed 
passions played a large role in the puritanical agenda, as did the side-lining of ritual 
behaviour. Central to these regimes of discipline was the divorcing of the public from the 
private which set into motion the confinement of emotion to the private realm. Notions of 
‘privacy’ and ‘intimacy’ developed, which in the seventeenth century served to alter living 
arrangements in particular.14 Charles Taylor describes this ‘buffered, disciplined self’ as the 
seat of the ‘individual’.15 
Stjepan Meštrović’s Postemotional Society brings this account of the progressive 
marginalisation of emotion into conversation with concurrent developments in the sphere of 
mass communication technology.16 Meštrović describes the late modern individual’s 
proclivity for absorbing and rehearsing ‘dead emotions from the past’ in a synthetic manner, 
as affectively infused rituals and events become abstracted and de-sensitised from their 
broader situations and then re-inserted into a ‘mass-produced’ context.17 Consumers are drip-
fed pre-meditated emotional packages by marketing campaigns that are especially engineered 
to solicit particular responses, and so ‘because the present cannot be a source of spontaneous 
emotion…inspiration must come from the past’.18 ‘Postemotionalism’, Meštrović writes, 
‘refers to the use of dead, abstracted emotions by the culture industry in a neo-Orwellian, 
mechanical, and petrified manner’.19 
These ‘repression’ narratives are only half the story: historians of emotion are far 
from unanimous in their conclusions about the affective directions of Western society. In 
fact, there is a competing and inverted genealogy of emotion, which, according to Riis and 
Woodhead, highlights ‘the triumph of manifold emotional expressivism’.20 This story speaks 
of the ‘“turn to the self” and personal emotions, whose cultural roots can be traced to 
Romanticism’.21 Riis and Woodhead explore Cancian and Gordon’s account of the ‘changing 
emotion norms’ in twentieth century American marriages from an ascetic approach that 
emphasised ‘self-sacrifice, avoidance of conflict, and rigid gender roles’, to one that 
celebrated ‘self-development, open communication of negative and positive feelings…and 
more flexible [gender] roles’.22 Interestingly, the ‘trend toward individualism’ is again 
identified as the source of these changes, mirroring and inverting the role it plays in 
repression narratives.23 Bellah et al. lament what they see as the mounting narcissism of the 
‘therapeutic’ ethic, which has reconfigured interpersonal relationships into ‘lifestyle 
enclaves’, through its focus on ‘personal preference’ and the expression of feelings.24 Gender 
and queer theorists might enquire whether this bemoaning is in fact a negative reaction to the 
perception that society is becoming ‘sentimentalised’ and hence ‘feminised’. From this 
perspective, emotion is ‘leaking’ into the public sphere, forcing men to join women in the 
‘cult of sensibility’, and hence threatening modernity’s tidy public/private dualism. 
Analysis of the Genealogies 
Before we proceed to examine the counter-thesis of this paper, let us properly consider how it 
is that scholars have come to describe inversely proportionate genealogies of emotion.25 Both 
genealogies presuppose that rationalisation processes necessarily affect the extent to which 
emotions are expressed within a society. In the narratives of repression, reason is roughly 
inversely proportionate to emotion, in such a way that, as reason triumphs, emotional 
expression falters. In the narratives of expression, conversely, as reason flourishes, emotion 
also thrives but this may be because indulging one’s emotions is reconfigured as ‘rational’ 
under an individualistic regime that places a premium on selfhood.  Should we be troubled by 
the fact that these two narratives are united in locating the cause of the modern emotional 
regime in rationalisation and individualisation processes, and yet draw diametrically 
opposing conclusions about the effects of such causes? What does this tell us about the 
historiography of emotion, as well as its history?  
With their content stripped away, the skeletons of these arguments tell a ‘grand 
narrative’ of the sweeping forces of modernity that have swiftly done away with centuries of 
habitual emotion patterns and ritual behaviour.26 Barbara Rosenwein writes that the ‘Middle 
Ages serve as a convenient foil for modernity’ when it comes to the history of emotion.27 By 
reconceiving the pre-modern as a largely homogenous stretch of time, history appears to be 
loosely divided into three largely discrete time-periods: the pre-modern, the modern and the 
postmodern. Bruno Latour would insist that this is where they take a wrong turn. ‘Our 
modern mythology’, he argues, ‘consists in imagining ourselves as radically different’ to the 
premoderns, or indeed other cultures.28 On the contrary, ‘we have never been modern’, being 
the creatures of habit that we are.29 Manuel de Landa’s ‘non-linear’ historical methodology 
draws inspiration from Deleuze and Guattari to artfully demonstrate how ‘human history is 
not marked by stages of progress but by coexistences of accumulated materials of diverse 
kinds’.30 Cancian and Gordon’s focused account of emotional expression in twentieth-century 
American marriages in fact draws a nuanced conclusion that is dealt rather lightly by 
Woodhead and Riis. Cancian and Gordon explicitly state, ‘if we consider the entire twentieth 
century, instead of decades, we find a zigzag pattern of change associated with political 
liberation and oppression, not a linear trend’ (italics mine), even if we can deduce some 
broader normative shifts.31  
If we proceed to dispose of a singular, linear notion of time, then it becomes easier to 
understand that the effects of these processes are at least as multifarious and complex as the 
causes themselves. The anti-ritualism of Reformation theology may have functioned to 
internalise religious emotions and inhibit their collective expression, but, in turn, these 
second-order processes may also have encouraged those privatised emotions inscribed onto 
bodies to re-emerge in unexpected ritual ‘formations’. Cultural shifts take place at different 
rates, in such a way that at any one point we are harbouring a mishmash of inconsistent, and 
at times incoherent emotional configurations and cognitive propositions, Tylorian ‘survivals’, 
Enlightenment ideals and post-Enlightenment reservations about those same ideals.32 It is 
only our lingering and misguided belief in the rationality, transparency and coherence of 
Enlightenment man that serves to obfuscate these processes or sees them as overwhelmingly 
problematic.33 
It is not just the structure of these narratives of modernity that require 
complexification, but the understandings of ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ which they share and rely 
upon. Both narratives posit an unhelpful causal relationship between the two, and the 
concomitant sense they are antipodean to one another. Antonio Damasio’s research in the 
field of neuroscience has demonstrated that even quotidian processes of decision-making rely 
upon emotional input. He concludes, along with other scholars like Solomon and De Sousa, 
that emotion is essential in order for us to navigate through our lives.34 Affect theorist Silvan 
Tomkins inverts a Kantian approach when he writes, ‘reason without affect would be 
impotent’, and ‘affect without reason would be blind’.35  
 
Riis and Woodhead also acknowledge that language allows us to ‘imagine that 
“emotion” and “reason” are “things” that can be located and measured and neatly 
compartmentalised’, whereas, in reality, ‘emotion’ and ‘rationality’ are both ‘collective’ 
terms that direct ‘attention to a range of processes and phenomena’.36 For example, whilst for 
most Protestants (and, indeed, Catholics), religious affects, i.e. spiritual emotions carry value, 
it is those passions emerging from the body that are often regarded with suspicion. Religious 
affects can be broken down further too: consider the difference between a serene emotion of 
gratitude that emerges from ‘cool’ contemplative prayer and a ‘hot’ emotion of fear or desire 
that arises following a controversial sermon.  
 
Theologian Simeon Zahl has argued that the scholarly focus on Luther’s anti-
subjectivist polemic against ‘enthusiasm’ has overlooked the fact that there are ‘unresolved 
tensions’ in Luther’s own thought between a ‘cold Protestant confessionalism’, and an 
‘affectively-oriented’ theological anthropology, the latter taking on ‘particular significance’ 
alongside ‘contemporary renewal movements, which tend to be deeply affectively-oriented’ 
(and reflect the emotional extravagance of early Protestant offshoots like the Shakers and 
Diggers).37 The Protestant history of religious affects is, then, complex enough, let alone the 
history of emotion in general, and so this paper limits itself to commenting only on the 
collective ritual expression of ‘hot’ religious affects in two contemporary renewal 
movements.  
 
This casual treatment of ‘emotion’ and reliance on an epistemology of modernity 
which understands processes like individualisation, rationalisation and public/private 
differentiation to be complete, is the methodological reason why scholars have picked up on a 
large amount of evidence that supports both the repression and expression of emotion in late 
modern society. And yet even repression narratives that emphasise discontinuity in our 
emotional history do not go so far as to suggest ‘rationalised’ individuals would stop feeling 
emotions entirely or cease to carve spaces for their collective expression. The privatisation of 
emotion is not the expiration of emotion; the very notion of emotional repression 
paradoxically draws attention to its ongoing attendance. Meštrović explicitly draws attention 
to this when he writes, ‘emotions did not really disappear’, but a new set of ‘mechanical, 
mass-produced emotions’ became the order of the day.38 Therefore, despite the substantial 
differences between the two narratives, both cannot avoid conceiving of emotion as a steady, 
embodied technology of the self that is permitted more or less scope for expression in 
different cultural environments. Communal ritual has historically been an important medium 
for the public expression of certain ‘hot’ religious affects. Although the modern project has 
sought to privatise, secularise, and ultimately repress their public and communal expression, 
they nonetheless ‘leak out’ in unexpected ritual ‘formations’ in post-secular post-modernity 
(to use a hydraulic metaphor). This has eventually forced the surrounding climate of secular 
liberalism to accommodate these post-secular movements as examples of diversity within 
unity, rather than suspicious subcultures. 
Insights from Affect Theory 
Put another way, the distinction between the genealogies of repression and expression pivots 
on the tension between socially constructivist accounts of emotion which suggest that the 
possibility of being affected, and the textures of these affects, are infinite and purely 
culturally predicated, and new materialist accounts that wish to emphasise the more 
‘intransigent’ and ‘semi-stable’ nature of emotion on, say, evolutionary grounds.39 Naturally, 
the constructivist/essentialist debate has also found its way into discussions in affect theory 
and is useful in fortifying my argument that emotion is a steady, embodied technology of the 
self which, when repressed, will find another space for self-expression. 
In Religious Affects, Schaefer identifies and categorises two streams of affect theory; 
the Spinozistic-Deleuzian and the phenomenological.40 In the former, the emphasis is on 
affect as ‘always in flux, the plasticity and endless reshaping of substance through the 
reformation of its infinite attributes’.41 Brian Massumi brings a Spinozistic understanding of 
emotions as a ‘question of lines, planes and bodies’ into conversation with contemporary 
neuroscientific experiments via Deleuze, presenting an understanding of the body as 
indefinitely variable.42 Massumi states that in the body, ‘the levels at play could be multiplied 
to infinity’; affect is the ‘point of emergence’ where only one of the ‘multiple and normally 
mutually exclusive potentials’ are ‘selected’.43  
Using a Deleuzian motif, Schaefer likens this understanding of the body to ‘sand 
castles, granulated conglomerates that are susceptible to radical reformation by the action of 
multidirectional waves washing over them’.44 This ‘biological hyperplasticity’ hence 
corresponds to a social constructivist account of affective discontinuities, and the genealogy 
of emotional repression.45 This kind of understanding is useful to the extent that it allows for 
endless possibilities and combinations of personal and social emotional transformation; affect 
emerges as ‘the space of becoming’.46 On the other hand, however, there is a sense in which 
social constructivism has gone too far, producing theories that are difficult to buy into on the 
level of common sense, and could only have come out of the academy.47 The sand castle may 
take infinite shapes, but each grain of sand is the same, an agglomeration of molecules of 
silicon dioxide. There is hence an inescapable atomistic essentialism to even the most plastic 
of models. 
This lingering essentialism is perceptible in Deleuzian affect theory’s attempt 
analytically to separate affect from emotion.48 Affects, it is said, are ‘irreducibly bodily and 
autonomic’, whereas emotion is ‘the socio-linguistic fixing of the quality of an experience 
which is from that point onward defined as personal’.49 When an affect rises to the level of 
awareness, and ‘attains the level of conscious reflection’, it becomes an ‘emotion’ that can be 
described.50 Schaefer, Ahmed and others are sceptical of this attempt to cut off emotion from 
affect, on the grounds that it presupposes that there is, in fact, a clear moment between 
awareness and non-awareness of emotion, conscious and subconscious, public and private.51 
When does affect become emotion? Could such a moment be pinpointed? In reality, these 
divisions are rather fuzzy. The system confines affect to the ‘prephenomenological sphere’, 
presupposing ‘in advance that structure and awareness can be comfortably set aside from the 
prestructured or preconscious forces that make them up’.52 It imports a ‘distinctly liberal 
ontology’ which ‘sees bodies as starting from a uniform position of epistemic and 
experiential neutrality’ rather than ‘fused to a biological history’, Schaefer writes.53 As such, 
it continues to draw strength from a kind of Enlightenment, and presumably Lockean notion 
of personhood that views the self as ‘a free man, a blank slate’, another Tylorian ‘survival’ 
that endures beyond its usefulness. 54 
For Ahmed, the separation of emotion and affect also ‘risks cutting emotions off from 
the lived experiences of being and having a body’.55 In rejecting the naturalistic and the 
materialistic, tropes which have historically been attached to the female, there is a sense in 
which an over-exaggerated social constructivism is counterproductive to feminist objectives, 
denying to women that which appears to make them women, sterilising and ‘rationalising’ 
(hence, masculinising) their physicality. The materialist shift seeks to address this ‘sort of 
overcorrection’, this ‘sharp swing of the pendulum from biological determinism to biological 
hyperplasticity’, which has been branded a ‘hygiene of current antiessentialism’.56 
Given these shortcomings, I follow Schaefer when he advocates the 
‘phenomenological’ model of affect, (and argues that ‘affect’ and ‘emotion’ should be used 
interchangeably). Schaefer introduces the notion of ‘intransigence’ which suggests that 
‘emotions are built into our bodies – that they are artifacts of an embodied evolutionary 
history’ that persist ‘across bodies’ and create ‘species-specific, embodied universals 
imprinted at birth’.57 Schaefer calls this account ‘postessentialist’, drawing on Sedgwick 
when she writes, ‘there is not a choice waiting to be made between essentialism and no 
essentialism. If there’s a choice it is between differently structured residual essentialisms’.58 
This insight is useful when read alongside the conclusions made in this paper concerning the 
genealogies of emotion. The evidence for both expression and repression illustrates the 
multiplicity of different types of emotional effects and counter-effects simultaneously, but 
also the ‘intransigent’ nature of the human capacity to experience emotion more generally, 
which in the face of repression, will flow into new spaces and create novel formations for 
self-expression. Phenomenological affect theory therefore allows us to ‘map the lines linking 
biologically grounded emotional responses – for example, fear – to religion and other systems 
of power’.59  
Ritual is not dead. It is Born Again! 
Armed with some understanding of phenomenological affect theory, let us now apply this 
model to post-secular renewal movements. In the public spaces of secular modernity, the 
communal expression of ‘hot’ religious affects is formally or at least nominally prohibited. 
Yet because of their intransigent and residual nature, these affects nonetheless irrupt at the 
surface of our socially-entangled bodies, forcing the emergence of new spaces for self-
expression in unpredictable and often intense ‘formations of the post-secular’. The 
expectation that their privatisation would be successful appears to be hinged on the 
‘assumption that emotions are a private matter, that they simply belong to individuals, or 
even that they come from within and then move outward toward others’.60 However, this 
model assumes ‘the objectivity of the very distinction between inside and outside, and 
between the individual and the social’, an objectivity that can no longer be sustained. 61 In 
other words, emotions neither originate from inside the body travelling outward, nor do they 
emerge from the social body and proceed inward (a Durkheimian model). Therefore, rather 
than attempting to locate emotion in either the private individual or social body, affect is that 
which ‘involves an interweaving of the personal with the social, and the affective with the 
mediated’.62 Biologically embedded emotions are therefore contiguous and ‘economic’, 
aligning ‘individuals with communities – or bodily space with social space – through the very 
intensity of their attachments’.63 The economy of affect is contagious and generative, 
‘sticking’ what Rosenwein calls ‘emotional communities’ together, as they are transmitted 
from one body to the next (even across a virtual platform like social media).64 Randall Collins 
observes how the ‘emotional energy’ produced in affectively-infused rituals is circulated time 
and time again, creating a kind of ‘ritual chain’.65  
The Sunday Assembly is a ‘secular church’ that seeks to emulate and revive the 
affective economies of institutionally religious ritual behaviour without the ontological 
theism towards which communal ritual is ordinarily directed. Its website states that the 
movement seeks to ‘inject a touch of transcendence into the everyday’ taking an atomistic 
approach that seeks to separate the ‘good bits’ of religion from the ‘bad’.66 The yearning for 
the kind of ‘emotional energy’ that is produced in communal ‘ritual chains’ is what draws in 
adherents: its charter declares, ‘just by being with us you should be energised, vitalised, 
restored…’ (italics mine).67 A ‘communal visceral response’ is generated through ritual 
behaviour like group singing, which emulates the collectivising function hymn-singing serves 
by attuning and syncing individuals’ auditory senses together. 68 Comedy routines replace 
sermons, ‘sticking’ adherents together through sharing the experience of laughter (the 
kinaesthetic manifestation of the emotion of humour or joy). ‘Genuine human connection’ is 
promised as a solution to the ills of ‘modern society’ with its demands upon individuals to 
project a kind of de-emotionalised self that serves to cut one off from one’s ‘inner self, 
alienated, bored and unhappy, in a society which feels fake and artificial’.69 Drawing on the 
discourses of Jungian psychology and popular philosophy, Sanderson suggests that the 
yearning for ‘ecstasy’ and ‘catharsis’ that characterises our contemporary anomie is only 
overcome through the embodied collective experience of a kind of intersubjective affectivity 
that has therapeutic qualities.70 The psychocultural thematic tensions of control/spontaneity, 
authenticity/falsity and distance/intimacy that preoccupy late modern rhetoric can hence be 
seen to permeate the narrative of purpose constructed by the movement.71  
As a self-proclaimed ‘house of love’, the Sunday Assembly secularises the notion of 
agape, meeting the emotional desire for a love greater than eros, a love that comes from 
beyond a single person. Theologically-speaking, this outpouring of love is the outcome of 
Jesus’ kenosis and points to the ontological reality of the transcendent; in the Sunday 
Assembly, it is provided by the immanent presence of the community of individuals. Item 
three of its online charter declares, ‘we don’t do supernatural’, which implies that in counter-
defining itself as atheistic, the Sunday Assembly is operating with a Tylorian definition of 
religion that privileges belief in the supernatural.72 If we are to draw on, for instance, Smart’s 
‘dimensions of religion’ instead, then the Sunday Assembly can be understood as a post-
secular ‘religious’ renewal movement without theistic ontology.73 Rather than serving as 
evidence for the essentialist nature of ‘religion’, it constitutes evidence for the thesis that 
ritual expressions of embodied affects continue to take new and interesting ‘formations’ 
under a formally secular banner.74 
Another fascinating instantiation of post-modern and post-secular affective formations 
can be found in the spaces for ritual expression carved by the Pentecostal movement. Jon 
Bialecki has observed that Pentecostals ‘foreswear’ ritual, which functions not to ‘remove 
ritual but rather allows it to grow stronger’.75 The democratisation of the Spirit amongst 
believers allows both pastor and congregation to ‘initiate ritual in most settings’, Joel 
Robbins notes.76 Ritual interaction thus ‘serves as an excellent fount for Durkheim-like 
effervescence, an affective surge produced and conveyed in one moment of synchronized, 
intersubjective activity that can serve as the motor for another ritual moment farther down the 
line’.77 Under the ‘nominal rejection of overtly marked ritual…endless small, affectively 
charged interactions’ mushroom, affording Pentecostal services their vitality and power.78 For 
Pentecostal academic theologians Amos Yong and James K. A. Smith, this power gestures 
towards the Spirit’s unique capacity to indwell in material substances and ‘embrace human 
nature in ways that make Christian life holistic and even, in a peculiarly Pentecostal way, 
sacramental’.79 The role of other worshipping bodies in the ritual setting is essential in 
summoning the Spirit, or, more accurately, in making the congregation ‘ready to receive it’.80 
In joining these bodies together, the immanent experience of the Spirit is not a private 
experience but becomes publically constituted and economic, ‘sticking’ adherents together.81  
There is therefore an underlying parity between what anthropologists might label 
‘communitas’ here, and theologians might recognise as ‘koinonia’ (see e.g. Acts 2:42; 
Gal.2:9).82 
In rendering the affective and socially-entangled body a crucial site of ritual activity 
that is directed towards the divine, Pentecostalism acts to recalibrate the subject’s various 
sensory modalities, and bring them all into focus. This explains why Pentecostals so often use 
kinaesthetic language to describe the Spirit’s ‘touch’, and erotic ‘embrace’, and also express 
an embodied and affective fear of demonic intrusion. Holy laughter may ‘spread contagiously 
in waves through the congregation’, according to Thomas Csordas, as believers experience 
‘the comfort and joy of the Spirit’, (rather than of the comedian, as per the Sunday 
Assembly).83 Interestingly for our argument, the sensory content of this joy is often described 
thermoceptively as ‘warmth’ or ‘heat’, and resonates with the fire symbolism associated with 
the Holy Spirit in the New Testament (and beyond).84 Pentecostal systematic theologian, 
Stephen Land observes that ‘“signs” and “groans”…express and shape the affections’ in 
services.85 It is ‘in and through the community’ that these passions are ‘formed and 
expressed’, Land writes, through singing, dancing, tears and clapping.86 Glossolalia and 
ecstatic experience are non-linguistic expressions of affect which are experienced as 
spontaneous as they appear to arise independently of the will, but are pre-empted through the 
structure of liturgy: key changes in the backing music and shifts in mood expressed on 
participants faces act as affective signs that point to transitions in phases of worship.87 The 
more these signs ‘circulate, the more affective they become, and the more they appear to 
“contain” affect’, which, for Pentecostals, points to the Spirit’s immanent presence during 
worship.88 Glossolalic rituals in particular generate an affectively-oriented, rather than, or in 
addition to, a linguistically or cognitively-oriented community. As such, these communities 
are equipped to transcend the particularities of regional vernaculars, as glossolalia serves as 
the globalised non-verbal language of Pentecostal discourse.  
The collective deliverance rituals of the international Pentecostal church, Mountain of 
Fire and Miracles (MFM), are emotively suffused with a ‘ritual language dosed with a certain 
tone of verbal aggression and militarism’.89 This affectively-charged ritual discourse derives 
from a Manichean epistemology that understands the universe as ‘polarised by benevolent 
and malevolent spiritual entities’.90 Under this cosmology of conflict, prayer becomes a 
‘powerful military strategy’ that is most effective when accompanied by bodily practices like 
fasting, according to the General Overseer, Daniel Olukoya.91 Afe Adogame observes that the 
rituals of prayer in this context become ‘performative’ acts, containing a kind of energy: they 
‘not only say things, they also do things’, those ‘things’ being the expulsion of malevolent 
spirits.92 Although a relatively new Deliverance church, the comparatively emotive and 
aggressive style of worship in MFM has garnered a reputation for being ‘extreme’ and 
‘frightening’.93  
The ‘Do-It-Yourself’ prayer strategy that is directed towards the laity serves to 
democratise ritual power and thereby encourage the transmission of affect, as adherents take 
matters into their own hands. The strategy prescribes a technical and precise set of eight 
prayer stages to follow in order to secure one’s deliverance. These begin with, for instance, 
the ‘hot’, ‘loud confession of scriptures promising deliverance’ (e.g. 2 Timothy 4:18), 
progressing to the laying on of hands which is to be recognised by worshippers ‘swaying’ and 
‘staggering’ with emotion.94 The ritualistic ‘climax’ is a display of exorcism, but it is the 
affective contributions of the worshippers that secure the success of the deliverance ritual by 
forcing the ‘supersensory entities’ to ‘grant their petitions and requests’.95 Moreover, such 
ritual performances are frequently broadcast live on the MFM website, allowing online 
viewers around the world to both absorb, and participate in the ‘sticky’ collective affective 
economy.96 For those worshippers present during the service, the knowledge of it being 
broadcasted nurtures this affective allegiance, as the far-reaching powers of their prayers 
cannot be constrained by geographical limitations. Whilst the church has its headquarters in 
Nigeria, those who have migrated elsewhere continue to tune into services online; in theory, 
anywhere with internet access can henceforth become a site for the ritual expression of 
religious affects. In this sense, worshippers of all types and places are both participants and 
observers, insiders and outsiders engaging in the exchange of emotional capital. By 
harnessing the power of mass communication and social media in particular, they make use 
of an already public-private platform for a kind of evangelism that operates by creating an 
affective allegiance to the group. This kind of proselytising uses emotional signalling to 
transcend localities and furnish its members with a globalised and affectively-imbued 
discourse that can be communicated across a multitude of physical and virtual mediums. The 
collective affective economy of Pentecostalism thus serves as testament to the thesis that the 
public/private divide is disintegrating rapidly in the post-secular context, and raises questions 
about whether the global/local binary continues to serve as a useful heuristic tool for scholars 
more generally. As James Sweeney puts it, ‘religion’s re-emergence does more than reclaim 
an empty stall in the public square; it raises questions about the public square itself’.97 
Conclusion 
Scholarly narratives of both emotional repression and expression veil an overly optimistic 
estimation of modernity’s success in its project. The formal or at least nominal secularity of 
late modernity has typically attempted to confine the communal and enthusiastic expression 
of religious ritual to the private sphere, a move predicated on certain assumptions about the 
boundedness of this domain, of the nature of emotion and of the self that can no longer be 
sustained.  This process of confinement has served to repress certain residual and embodied 
religious affects, which have subsequently and simultaneously re-emerged through the ritual 
practices of post-secular movements, two examples of which have been explored here. These 
movements gain their energy from the rich emotional repertoire – joy, power, aggression, and 
so on - which they are able to offer adherents who (whether consciously or unconsciously), 
feel that secular modernity fails to afford them socially acceptable spaces for collective, 
emotional ritual expression. The new tributaries they carve are both determined by this 
hostile context and serve to shape it in turn, as they demonstrate the inadequacy of the 
public/private heuristic whilst participating in its very demise. As such, these movements 
represent an attempt to escape the disenchanted immanence of secular modernity, which has 
little choice but to accommodate them by virtue of its fragile commitment to liberal 
multiculturalism. It is ironic, then, that the non-violent co-existence of all post-secular 
renewal movements is perhaps dependent upon the very cultural relativism secularism 
produces, to begin with.98 By distancing god from the world, secularism has created a kind of 
parity between all religions through an implicit assumption that none are true. In this way, all 
religions are both valid and yet paradoxically false. 
Insights from affect theory assist us in illuminating these processes and supplying us 
with a critical vernacular with which to theorise them, demonstrating the scope for its 
application to theology, as well as to the anthropology of (post-)secularism. Whether we call 
it ritual or sacrament, incarnation or embodiment, affect or pathos, those working in theology 
and those working in religion so often ask the same questions, even if they speak different 
academic languages. But in a world where there are those who are secular and yet have faith 
in atheism, and those who are religious and yet have faith in secularism (or, at least, its scope 
for religious pluralism), it seems there is less and less use in maintaining the oppositional 
nature of belief and unbelief, public and private, reason and emotion, and more use in 
problematising them. By parsing these academic languages and their dichotomies we might 
find further common ground between them, and between us all. 
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